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Abstract
The Misesian lesson in a transition framework leads to a number of questions about the very
aims pursued by individuals as they switched from the communist regime to a so-called capitalist
environment. According to the answers provided, one may then understand why so many
candidates to free-market experiments are now evolving towards some kind of mixed-economy
system.
This paper tries to suggest the right questions by looking at the origin of the transition
process in Eastern Europe. Four different theories are put forwards and analyzed.
It is concluded that the so-called transition economies did not opt for a clearly-defined
institutional system to oppose to Soviet communism. Rather, transition should refer to a painful
process of finding out new institutional rules apt to replace the previous order. Nationalistic feelings
surely play an important role and may explain why paternalistic policies tend to be welcome.
From a praxeological viewpoint, it will be important to assess whether the present
institutional framework is flexible enough to accommodate today's yearning for paternalistic
policies, but strong enough to resist pressure to transform paternalism into redistribution and
thereby award privileges to new rent-seeking coalitions.A praxeological view of Post-Soviet institutional engineering
Some critical elements of Misesian economics
The Misesian approach to economics and policy-making includes two primary
methodological lessons. First, economic science is meaningful only if applied to discern whether
rules and agendas are appropriate to achieve predetermined ends. Discussing about the ends is far
from irrelevant, of course; but it remains outside the scope of economic analysis. On the other hand,
economics is rooted in praxeology
1, since outcomes are generated by human behaviour within a
framework of rules and norms. Put differently, economic analysis should not evaluate the ideal
purposes of legislation and policy-making. Rather, it should assess whether individual conduct
constrained by given norms is compatible with - or leads to - the desired results.
Second, the only fair way to weigh the value of human action in a social framework is
through the lenses of subjectivism. The consequences are straightforward and powerful. Human
action is legitimate whenever it does not use violence in order to restrain other people's behaviour.
Furthermore, agents are entitled to compensation for their actions by an amount equal to what other
individuals are willing to forego in order to benefit from those very actions.
Unfortunately, both statements are far from being embraced in everyday policy studies and
undertakings. The praxeological significance of economic investigation is by and large neglected.
Although the notion of individual freedom is frequently referred to (and abused of), subjectivism as
a criterion to appraise the legitimacy of human action is de facto ignored. On the contrary,
nowadays a great deal of economic analysis concentrates on more or less refined versions of
rational-maximization exercises in a static framework, whereby agents are assumed to be
competing within a neoclassical setting featuring relatively low transaction costs. Hence, orthodox
policy assessments tend to be focused on the comparison of the real world with a range of ideal
equilibria; each of them associated with a different redistribution target and thus distinctive ethical
implications.
                    
1  Defined by von Mises (1980, p.3) as die allgemeine Lehre vom menschlichen Handeln.2
These exercises are sometimes useless. In most cases they are however definitely harmful.
The reason is that recent model building neglects to identify the goal towards which policy action is
directed. Results should therefore be disregarded as long as they provide irrelevant conclusions
about the equilibrium properties of an imaginary economy. In fact they are used in order to
rationalize and justify policy-making initiatives that remain highly questionable from a moral
viewpoint. In other words, distorted outcomes can be - and are - made acceptable by a methodology
that takes the so-called rotating Nirvana economy as a constraint and by defining the policy goal as
the effort to enhance its working. Today's competition policy is a clear example. Of course, by
doing so the main responsibility of the policy maker - identifying the goals and carrying out
appropriate action - is reduced, whereas accountability is almost emptied of any practical meaning.
Surely, individual freedom continues to be advocated as the foremost moral value to be
protected by modern democratic societies. This is certainly a major advancement with respect to the
past, when romanticism and religious integralism justified the use of violence in order to promote
the national advantage - whatever this expression may mean - at the expense of foreign interests
2.
This change of attitude is by all means welcome. Nevertheless, today's understanding of individual
freedom has little to do with subjectivism. The former is taken as a synonym for the freedom to
vote. While the latter refers to the freedom to select and to choose, which is indeed the notion upon
which free-market legitimacy is based. Put differently, the notion of fairness has today been abused
in order to support interest groups looking for normative rents at the expense of weaker or less
organized collections of individuals. For instance, the labour theory of value, which had killed
economic science for some two centuries, has not been replaced by a view consistent with
methodological individualism. But rather by some sort of a social theory of value, where the term
"social" tends to be a euphemism for the preferences of the winning coalitions.
As pointed out above, Mises' principles did not affect the economic profession to any
significant extent. Similarly, they hardly had an impact on policy behaviour. By and large this can
be explained by Mises' failure to develop his ideas into a successful ideology
3, a problem he shared
                    
2  It is slightly more problematic to reconcile the notion of individual freedom with the persistence
of mercantilism. For mercantilism is still alive and kicking, both in its traditional forms (trade
policy) and in its modern version (the welfare state).
3  The main reason for this failure is that an ideology is a criterion to evaluate a social system. But
according to Mises (and to the Austrian School, of course) the best judge of a social arrangement is
the consumer, who expresses his preferences through the market system. Hence, the evaluation of a3
with the classical liberal tradition. An ideology is however crucial in order to transform theoretical
tenets into an appealing code of conduct for policy makers. That is, into a widely-accepted program
for policy-making and therefore into a system of rules according to which the legitimacy of social
behaviour - as expressed by interest groups and their representatives - may be acquiesced to.
This failure is not surprising. By advocating economics as a social science with little room
for technocratic constructivism and no justification for collectivist values, Mises (1940/80) made
sure that his approach would have indeed appealed to a relatively small number of passionate
intellectuals inclined to oppose rent-seeking interest groups and discretionary political powers.
Unfortunately, his approach could hardly offer a Weltanschauung promising a better world, where
the problem of scarcity would be eliminated, and thus with a strong enough message to captivate
the attention and the votes of large enough crowds. In other words, by focusing on liberty and
subjectivism the Misesian message emphasized the role of personal responsibilities in the social
context. And by defining a social context as a system of interactions among accountable
individuals, Mises belittled the role of legitimate action by social entities. He therefore ruled out the
possibility that an elite could legitimately pursue a socially defined goal. In short, in the Misesian
world there was no room for allegedly self-appointed ministers of the prevailing ideology.
Contrary to the tradition of the Enlightenment and of classical economics, Mises was aware
that the lack of an ideological pledge to secure a world without need and suffering was bound to
undermine the impact of subjectivism on future society. Indeed, this weakness explains why in
practice social policy even today uses ideology as a way to do without human action. For social
ideologies (e.g. nationalism) are outside the individual dimension, and are indeed instrumental in
emphasizing the role of society as an entity by itself, sometimes overruling individual preferences
4.
It follows that an economy can surely be run according to free-market criteria, but only if the costs
of enforcing ideologically-legitimized policies are high enough to prevent a social ideology from
                                                                 
social system boils down to how well the market system can work in a given social environment.
As suggested by Cubeddu (1993, p.189), the Misesian defense of the liberal "ideology"
came at the wrong historical moment. In fact, only in the 1960s could his argument make the object
of serious discussion.
4  Incidentally, disregard for human action allows so-called partial-equilibrium analyses - say the
economics unemployment, of investment, of money (each of them taken separately). These kinds of
exercises would be impossible within a Misesian framework, which emphasizes the role of a
comprehensive view of individual behaviour.4
coming to the surface and prevailing. This is hardly the case in modern societies.
These introductory comments also apply to recent history in the so-called transition
countries. In particular, they may help understand why such countries started out as clear candidates
for free-market experiments led by enlightened principles and are now evolving towards an updated
version of socialist economics, given democratic constraints. To these aspects are devoted the next
paragraphs of this contribution.
On the nature of East-European transition
When applied to the former Soviet bloc, the term transition normally refers to a clearly-
defined passage, from a given regime to new rules of the game. In particular, two features are
usually taken for granted: that transition has been (and is) a spontaneous phenomenon shared by the
vast majority of the agents involved and - second - that the social organization to be generated by
the transition process is exogenous: known in advance and therefore outside the scope of the
debate. Facts have shown that in the case of central and Eastern Europe these hypotheses do not rest
on firm ground
5. Still, they have been far from innocent from a normative viewpoint.
If acceptable, spontaneity has two important and somewhat delicate implications. First, it is
no longer necessary to question where transition is heading, since the very (spontaneous) features of
the transition process justify the legitimacy of the goal. This means that one is induced to overlook
the fundamental questions about the moral content of transition, i.e. about the principles that
legitimate transition and thus the adequacy of the policy actions that are carried out in order to
obtain the shared purposes. In addition, the notion of spontaneous change, away from communism
towards a loosely identified "better society", possibly characterized by regulated capitalism, opens
the way towards all sorts of experiments in free-market constructivism.
Spontaneous transition is a relatively safe assumption if a large component of the
population shares a strong-enough ideology, and relies upon it to oppose the moral underpinnings
of the incumbent regime
6. For instance, revolution against a totalitarian leader is easy to explain by
referring to a popular longing for democracy and - more important - to the unfairness of a system
                    
5  As will be argued later on, the only (partial) exception may have been Poland.
6  Consistent also with Mises' view, "moral" does not refer to "good", as opposed to "bad". Instead it
concerns the claim to legitimacy to establish and enforce rules with the purpose of enhancing social
behaviour. In turn, social behavior is based on praxeology and thus on individual preferences.5
that promotes the concentration of wealth and discretionary power to the exclusive benefit of a
small totalitarian elite.
Now, when the reality of Eastern Europe is taken into account, the spontaneous approach to
transition makes little sense, unless this term is called upon in order to describe the relatively
peaceful collapse of the communist regime at the end of the 1980s. But of course, a description is
not quite the same thing as an explanation. And the very fact that Eastern Europe has been
experiencing widespread frustration about transition, without much consensus about what should
have been done and when, justifies some consideration as regards what the rejection of collectivism
really meant. The following pages will rely heavily on Misesian methodology in order to offer some
praxeological arguments on these issues. The origins of the collapse will thus be reviewed, so as to
shed new light on the moral content of transition and the legitimacy of the policy-action programs
adopted by the new East-European leaders.
There exist at least four theories about the origins of the downfall of the Communist
regimes in Eastern Europe.
* One focuses on the domestic political weaknesses of the Soviet regime, as a consequence of
which the East-European satellites broke lose.
* A second one emphasizes the economic weaknesses of the centrally-planned economy.
* A third conjecture underscores the role of the Catholic Church, while
* A fourth hypothesis calls attention upon the self-defeating recruiting system of the ruling
elites in the Soviet bloc
7.
 Surely, these are not necessarily conflicting theories. Indeed, there are very good reasons to
believe that they all to a degree contributed to the end of Communism in that part of the world. But
it seems nevertheless preferable to investigate the importance of the various elements separately, so
as to emphasize their praxeological roles and thus bear different weight onto the legitimacy of
institutional change and of policy-making in particular.
Political crisis
                    
7  Other theories emphasize the role of President Reagan and of the so-called star-war race, and also
the role of human rights activism (Helsinki 1975). They have been here neglected for the main
issues they raise can be easily viewed as analogues to the other arguments.6
According to the political argumentation, the crisis of the whole Soviet system originated
from the fight for power that took place in the Soviet Union after the death of Brezhnev (1982). The
basic assumption is that the USSR regime was certainly totalitarian, but that after Brezhnev it
ceased to be a one-man dictatorship. The Party was no longer the monolithic organization shaped
by Lenin and Stalin.
At the beginning, the outside repercussions due to the internal political frictions were
modest. Economic and political freedoms remained restricted; while consensus for a highly
centralized system continued to prevail, perhaps for fear of an uncertain, possibly chaotic future. Or
- more likely - because the extended nomenklatura system offered enough safety and guaranteed
privileges (rents) to a large enough share of the population.
If true, this picture implies that very many USSR citizens did not have a strong interest in
changing the rules of the game radically and had relatively modest ambitions to improve their
material living standards
8. In short, people's concern for political freedom was not of the utmost
importance. This may be regrettable, but hardly surprising. History shows that freedom has seldom
topped the list of priorities of the majority of the population
9. The economic inefficiencies of the
Soviet world were of course perceived as enormous and manifest. But the waste was so evident that
a reformed communist regime was deemed to be adequate to provide a satisfactory answer to the
desire for better material living standards, even if inferior to Western levels.
Andropov's approach to the economic problems of the country seemed consistent with this
interpretation. During his premiership the central role of the Communist Party remained
unchallenged, while attempts to improve economic performance focussed on the fight against
corruption and efforts to inject energetic leadership. The idea whereby the average Soviet and East-
                    
8  The reference to the "material" living standards deserves some explanation. It is often overlooked
that people attribute different importance to the various elements that contribute to shape individual
living standards. For instance, in the recent past a substantial number of people have decided to take
advantage of higher productivity levels and of the welfare state in order to reduce their working
hours, sometimes to zero. This situation is generally known as voluntary unemployment. Their
choice clearly reveals that their living standard is higher than in a situation characterized by higher
monetary income, higher consumption of marketable goods and services (i.e. "material" living
standards), but also greater working efforts and less leisure.
9  As is known, the longing for freedom (and democracy) dates back to the classical world (see Jay,
2000, ch. 2 for a short survey). But both notions were restricted to a relatively small portion of the
population.7
European citizen longed to attain the kind of division of labour and meet the accountability
requirements that the capitalist mode of production entail never seemed to be considered as a
serious solution to the Soviet problem, not even by the dissidents.
As a matter of fact, the political thesis maintains that the Soviet system collapsed by
accident, almost against the will of the Soviet population. This sounds plausible. For the effects of
Gorbachev's rise came to a large extent unexpected
10. Gorbachev followed the sudden death of two
leaders - Andropov and Chernenko - who were more or less in line with the tradition of Soviet
politics and did not seem to be striving to change the political geography of the world in a few
months. He rose to the top because he had the necessary energy and cleanliness to handle the
transition from the old guard to the reformers within the Party; and to reconcile the role of the Party
with that of the nomenklatura, the former having lost much of its historical control on the latter. In
other words, Gorbachev was not expected to deviate from orthodoxy to any significant extent
11.
Thanks to his leadership, and consistent with the tradition of Brezhnev, the Party was confident it
could preserve and enhance its power, play the leading role in ferrying the regime towards an
improved planning system, monitor the efficiency and allegiance of the industrial nomenklatura.
As it turned out, Gorbachev adopted a shock-therapy approach to the political problem and
tried to delegitimate the nomenclature by breaking the informal rules of the game. But by
delegitimizing the nomenclature Gorbachev in fact gave power to the local centers of power -
outside the standard nomenclature, but not necessarily to the benefit of the Party. As a consequence,
the Soviets suddenly found themselves without the customary points of reference. The
nomenclature was no longer there to run what was de facto already a highly de-centralized
structure. Some version of capitalism was the only available workable solution left. The price to be
                    
10  As Brown (1996, ch. 1-3) makes clear, however, the rise of Gorbachev to power was not at all
unexpected. Indeed, he was a protégé of Andropov's and already a credible competitor in 1984,
when Andropov passed away. It is no accident that when Chernenko died, the appointment of
Gorbachev was little more than a formality. But as Arbatov said, it would have been quite another
matter if [the Politburo] had known what kind of policies Gorbachev was going to pursue both
domestically and internationally (quoted from Brown, 1996, p.81).
11  In particular, whereas Andropov had realized that something had to be done, Chernenko was a
typical representative of the Brehznevian political generation, highly corrupt and contrary to any
attempt to reform the system. But none of them envisaged radical institutional changes. At the
beginning not even Gorbachev could afford challenging the central political and economic role of
the Party.8
paid was however extremely high, for the boundaries between capitalism, local command systems
and criminal rule became thinner and thinner
12.
Economic crisis
Others have argued that the system collapsed mainly because of its poor economic
performance. Failure to grow provoked widespread discontent and forced the leaders to change the
system or just step down and allow the reformers to take over.
The main objection to this approach is that poor economic performance is an absolute
concept, whereby human behaviour is always a process of comparison and selection (Mises,
1949/1963). Poor economic performance justifies change only if compared with supposedly
superior alternatives. It follows that if one believes that economic crisis was responsible for the
collapse of the system, then it is implicitly assumed that over the 1980s preferences changed; or that
the existing economic system failed to deliver the implicitly guaranteed minimum living standards.
If so, the political leadership would have indeed been forced to enforce radical change.
Nevertheless, the evidence concerning the alleged change of preferences or the breach of
contract is mixed. If one looks at the whole Soviet bloc, it is undeniable that living standard had
been stagnating during the last two decades before the downfall. Furthermore, increasingly easy
access to Western information might have had a significant influence on the younger layers of the
population, which may have matured different preferences and different minimum-income
requirements than their elders. Finally, elderly people in some Eastern European countries might
have looked back with some nostalgia to the times preceding the Soviet invasion.
Then, if the communist rules of the game really became unacceptable during the Eighties,
one should have noticed growing unrest and demand for change all over the bloc, especially in
those areas where economic decline was more prominent or where exposure to Western living
patterns more marked. Still, this did not happen to any significant degree, with the exception of
Poland; and even there, economics did not play a very prominent role.
Surely, one could still conjecture that the local policymakers were shrewd and far-sighted
                    
12  According to Boettke (1993), however, Gorbachev was only interested in the redistribution of
power within the elite, in order to strengthen his own position. He had no intention to change the
system. But he did not understand that the Soviet economy was a cartelized economy. By breaking
up the cartel he created the demand for a truly market system which he failed to deliver.9
enough to anticipate turmoil; and change the rules of the game before violence could break out.
After all, it is preferable to be the leaders and rule-makers of a transition process to come, rather
than the victims.
The case of the Soviet Union does not support this prospect, though. As late as the mid-
1980s, a new and far-reaching approach to reform was not yet a feasible answer to an allegedly
widespread demand for it. Indeed, a large part of the political elite sitting in the Kremlin was not
even dreaming of it; not even the radical wing of the Supreme Soviet
13. They eventually realized
what was happening only when it was already too late to react and switch into reverse gear. That is,
the leaders were not in command of what was happening, even less were they thinking years ahead
and masterminding the process accordingly
14.
On the role of the Catholic Church
The only area where turbulence was serious throughout the Eighties (and also earlier) was
Poland, where the Catholic Church played a crucial role in opposing communism. Indeed, Poland
was probably the only communist country where the religious authorities did not seek compromise
with the regime and stuck by their claims to influence individual ethics, even when this clashed
with the socialist dogma. Of course, efforts intensified after the election of a Polish Pope and the
mild Ostpolitik of Pope John XXIII and Paul VI was abandoned.
The political strength of the Polish Church goes a long way back in Polish history. Among
its most relevant features, its century-deep association with the Polish national ideal stands out as
particularly important. This very ideal made the country a Western power and the Church its main
symbol; even in the darker periods of partition and of Austrian, German and Russian occupation. In
more recent times, the Church made sure that the myth of a free Polish nation was never sacrificed
to the ideal of a communist society. And when Pope John Paul II showed that communism dogmas
could be challenged openly (1979 pilgrimage), the conditions for a cultural revolution were
realized. Opposition gradually became stronger and spread among vast layers of the population.
                    
13  Gorbachev himself realized only two or three years later the full extent of the consequences of
the process he had started in 1985.
14  This was partly due to the ability of Gorbachev, who initially went a long way in reassuring the
corrupted hierarchies about their long-lived immunities; and the Party structure about its ongoing
guiding role within the reformed system of the late 1980s.10
Legitimacy for the regime eventually vanished when the Polish Army used violence against the
Polish population
15, irrespective of what was happening in the USSR.
By and large, two conclusions can be maintained. First, the role of the Catholic Church was
peculiar to Poland and limited to that country. In no other area of the Soviet bloc religious influence
was deep enough to oppose the incumbent regime and to offer people a consistent and clearly
discernible behavioural pattern different from homo sovieticus. Although Polish unrest showed to
everybody that the Soviet authorities were no longer able or willing to crush opposition to the
regime in the Seventies and Eighties, the strength of the catholic ideological message did not go
much beyond the Polish borders. And therefore did not inspire reactions similar to what was to be
observed in Poland. In particular, the message did not make a strong impact in Russia.
Second, the different ideological environment of Poland shows how important moral
standards can be when regimes run into difficulty and have lost their original ideological or military
thrust. The Church was strong because it never compromised with communism and focused its
action on human dignity and Polish patriotism. Cardinal Wyszynski and Pope Wojtyla played in
Poland a crucial role, for they showed that one could stand up to the regime. But their action would
have not been understood outside Poland. If Gorbachev had not destroyed the Party, the regime
would have not collapsed in the Soviet Union. 
The change of preferences and the dynamics of pressure groups
According to the last thesis mentioned here, individuals' interests in a collectivist society
change as the outside world evolves. For instance, a group of people in a primitive society does not
perceive specialization as a priority, since there are very little opportunities to exchange goods and
services. On the contrary, in a highly integrated world market economy those prevented from
trading and specializing according to price signals suffer relatively high opportunity costs.
Therefore, as the outside conditions change, the probability rises that latent coalitions strive to
change the system and take advantage of the opportunities that are now available. As we know from
Olson (1965), in a democratic regime these coalitions succeed in becoming active pressure groups
                    
15  See Weigel (1992) for a full account of how the Polish Pope succeeded in awakening Polish
national emotions, in emphasizing the contrast between the values fostered by the Soviet ideology
on the one hand and the cultural roots of the Polish nation on the other, in transforming compliance
into a bloodless revolution. 11
when they solve the free-rider problem; whereas in a totalitarian system this happens when they
manage to be co-opted by the incumbent oligarchy. This may be the outcome of an occasional
mistake by the incumbent elite. In other instances the challengers may have bought their way in.
These issues have already been discussed elsewhere and need not be analyzed further
16.
Alternatively, systemic change results from rather mechanical processes, whereby political
structures were rational when they were originally conceived, but turned out be outdated and even
counterproductive a few decades later. From this last standpoint, which relies heavily on the notion
of path-dependence, Soviet communism was bound to fall apart because the interest groups that
were guaranteeing its survival changed their perception of their own common interest. Thus, they
took an active part in changing the regime
17, not only because they wanted to anticipate revolution,
but rather because they had themselves a strong interest in abandoning the old centrally-planned
economic system, based on strict political control. Apparently, the shock came during the Brezhnev
years, when the leader was strong enough to control political dissidence, but not to control
corruption and stop the development of a large underground economy run by and to the benefit of
the top nomenclature. As a result, by the late Eighties, the Party was no longer able to discipline the
underground economy, whose beneficiaries became virtually unaccountable.
Summing up
Following the discussion so far, it is plausible to claim that the origins of the collapse of the
communist regimes in Europe were mainly of a political nature. The ideological issues that had
been set aside with terror and dogmatic orthodoxy in the Soviet Union since the time of Lenin and
Stalin came to the surface as soon as it became clear that deviations from the dogma were tolerated
and even encouraged.
As regards the USSR, Gorbachev initially believed that reforming the Communist Party
could solve the problem of economic stagnation. He then went on to weakening the Party and to
                    
16  See Colombatto-Macey (1998).
17  According to Ferrero (2001), this is true for Soviet communism, which was based on ruling
elites based on median or mean constituencies. On the contrary, in other countries - e.g. China and
Vietnam - power rested on modal constituencies who never relinquished control of the large state
companies. This was the essence of the mobilization regime, which has made sure that consensus
for the incumbent regime has remained substantial.12
breaking its control on the economic system, to the benefit of the periphery. But when the time
came for him to establish rule of law, while enforcing privatization and liberalization, his personal
charisma had become opaque. Peripheral powers widely understood were strong enough to avoid
re-centralization. Attempts to transfer economic powers from the peripheral political elites to the
market were successfully paralyzed. As a consequence, institutional change from the center could
no longer be realized. Corruption and the informal institutional structure that had been
accompanying the underground economy stayed intact; perhaps even expanded.
The economic system was however still one where orders had to come from the center, in
order to keep it in equilibrium (in the Hayekian interpretation of the word). When the center lost the
power to enforce orders, economic stagnation turned into economic decline. Chaos broke out - and
among other effects - it contributed to the comeback of "nationalities" as the central political
problem of the country.
As regards the satellite countries, foreign military oppression was perceived to be the main
question. The threat to national identity was felt at various degrees in the various countries,
following culture, history, possibly expectations. Of course, when this identity included both
nationalism and religion, tolerance was lower, as the case of Poland shows. When Soviet military
commitments vanished, the regimes took new shapes following - and by referring to - the perceived
nationalist and religious values. The splitting of Czechoslovakia is perhaps a fitting example.
In short, what argued so far leaves very little room to maintain that free-market ambitions
had something to do with the downfall of the Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe. The consequences
of this conclusion will be analyzed below.
Praxeological implications
The analysis of the origin of transition shows that different countries pursued hard-to-define
objectives - national identities was fairly common throughout the bloc, human dignity in Poland,
resistance to centralization in the Soviet Union, oligarchic power in some other countries. The only
element shared by the whole bloc was the downfall of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union,
and therefore of the organizational structure through which a tyrannical system could impose its
will upon different nationalities and different national states. With the exception of Poland, the
undoing of the regime was almost accidental, in that it depended crucially on the political horizon,
intelligence and charisma of one man - Gorbachev - who had the courage to begin a dangerous13
discovery process that led him to the heart of the communist dogma and then had the intellectual
honesty to change his beliefs during his rise to the top of the political ladder. In the end, he
destroyed the system while trying to save it from agony. For this very reason, it is sensible to claim
that transition never started, for the downfall of Communism was not a choice. Rather, it was a
welcome gift for most; a betrayal for many.
Put differently, the process of selection and choice implies that agents have a list of
alternatives. This was not the case in Eastern Europe. With the possible exception of the GDR, it
would however be hard to claim that the so-called transition economies (including Poland) decided
for a clearly-defined institutional system to oppose to Soviet communism, and that they rejected
communism in favour of a chosen alternative as soon as they had the opportunity. Instead of
starting a "transition" path, most of these countries actually embarked upon a painful process of
finding out new institutional rules apt to replace the previous order. As Winiecki (2000) has
recently pointed out, in all the transition countries privatization and entrepreneurship were
conceived as a top-down process, whereby old state-owned giants were to be transformed into
nimble private companies. The possibility of witnessing a bottom-up process whereby new firms
would replace old firms was not given much weight. The discovery process was to be carried out by
the central authorities according to constructivistic patterns. The very rise of a new class of
entrepreneurs in a truly competitive setting was an option to be considered (with great caution), not
the only obvious solution.
At the same time, it would be equally misleading to claim that failure to choose created
chaos, or that the destruction of communism left a vacuum filled by roving bandits and puppet
rulers. Two elements should be considered on this matter.
First, the collapse of the Party took place in the Soviet Union after other centers of political
power had come to the surface. Although the former communist nomenclature did not form the
backbone of newly-formed political parties, they ended up by heading technical (i.e. unaccountable)
central ministries, or by strengthening local bureaucratic systems. Their legitimacy turned out to be
correlated to their ability both to reduce accountability vis-à-vis the center and to extract privileges
from the center (such as tax relieves, protection against potential competitors, subsidies). In this
light, it appears that confusion and contradictions had virtually nothing to do with transition or with
failure to choose. They were the outcome of a confrontation between power centers, which the
constitutional system was unable to solve, and whereby no competitor had enough muscle to14
prevail. Although this situation was typical of the Soviet Union, other countries experienced similar
phenomena as well
18.
Second, in many instances the simmering problems of nationalism and nationalities played
an important role. They contributed to strengthening the rise of peripheral powers mentioned above,
so that the lack of totalitarian rule was often replaced by nationalism as the common element of the
social fabric
19. Economics played a secondary role. That does not necessarily mean that nationalism
will be a long-lasting moral justification for rule of law and Hayekian equilibrium. But it does
imply that all attempts to understand change after the collapse of Communism would be vain if
nationalistic ideologies are ignored. And it explains while free market in Eastern Europe is accepted
only to a degree, i.e. up to the point where free-market principles conflict with the perceived
national interests and identities.
Put differently, the East-European countries have been facing a range of questions that went
well beyond the problem of selecting an appropriate economic order; that is, of choosing between
planning and free market, as some naive commentators have suggested. For the choice of an
economic order depends heavily on the shared social system, an issue that can hardly be solved by
fiat through the top-down imposition of a perfect routine or of a consensus-maximizing
compromise.
                    
18  Among other things this helps understand why - ceteris paribus - small countries have a better
chance to speed up the process geared at creating or perceiving a stable institutional framework.
Unlike large economies, in small countries peripheral powers are too small to oppose the center;
unless communication and infrastructure are poor, and educational standards very poor,
decentralized leaders in small countries have no chance of preserving their powers unless they
cooperate with the center.
19  The emphasis on the term totalitarian is important. As pointed out in Monti Bragadin (2001) this
notion dates back to 1925. It was invented by Italian fascism to suggest that the regime founded by
Mussolini was to unify the country through shared values, rather than violence. In particular the
Party was not meant to be the tool through which the elite would impose its will upon the masses,
but the instrument through which the masses would unify under a common ideology. Hence the
reference to "totalitarianism".
The problem with Italian fascism was that this political goal turned out to be contradictory.
For an ideology almost necessarily must contain elitarian principles. Fascism solved the problem by
creating a set of images, a pseudo-ideology based on myths. When the shock came (June 1940) the
lack of ideology led to collapse.
The Soviet-style Communist parties ran into a similar problem when Gorbachev decided to
turn the Party from an elitarian structure into a totalitarian institution (mid-1980s). The destruction
of an elitarian ideology led to political democratization and thus to the end of the regime.15
Hence, the relevant praxeological question in Eastern Europe concerns how fast and in
which way people will be ready to abandon moral standards based on principles of national or
ethnic identity. Acceptance of the subjectivist ethics is by no means granted, not even in Poland.
For instance, EU membership would be an important incentive to move from the guarantee
provided by a nationalistic ideology to the safety of a continental welfare state.
Oddly enough, no theory of short-run praxeological transition has been put forward
20.
Despite this clear failure by social scientists, it should be manifest that free-market institutions as
such have little or no legitimacy in the post-Soviet world. The rather disappointing economic
performance of those countries in the past decade proves it beyond reasonable doubt. The better
results displayed in some areas should not mislead observers. Such results do not show that market-
oriented reform works. That is beside the point, for subjectivism always works, by definition. The
crucial questions are elsewhere. On the one hand, we should ask ourselves whether such relatively
satisfactory results are truly generated by praxeological change, rather than by smaller rent-seeking
pressures (see the small-country case mentioned earlier). On the other hand, one should investigate
what triggers the substitution of the nationalistic ideology in the various countries; and what the
substitute is. Obviously, the answer will also bear on historical and cultural variables.
For this very reason, it is apparent that a generalized normative approach and conclusion
would serve the cause of constructivism; much less the purpose of acquiring knowledge and using
it. Today the only kind of institutional engineering one would like to see is one praxeologically
neutral. That is, one which does not aim at shaping individual preferences by emphasizing the role
of the political process as a way to acquire consensus. This would be at odds both with nationalism
(which is based on consensus, rather than on the attempt to find compromise) and with free market
ideals (for obvious reasons). Unfortunately, this is instead what we witness as a consequence of
ongoing Western exercises in institutional engineering. Contrary to what occurred in other
historical moments, these exercises do not necessarily lead to a clash between formal and informal
institutions. In many cases neither are really defined. But they would certainly interfere with
praxeological change. The effect will be neither economic disaster, nor political instability. When
these apply, other sources should be held responsible. But opportunities will be missed, the
                    
20  See however Hayek (1952) for an attempt to lay the theoretical foundations in this domain, at the
border between economics and psychology. And also Quigley (1961/79) for an early long-run
analysis of the praxeological dynamics of elites.16
incentive to accept responsibilities will be reduced, and resistance to the illusion of the welfare state
will subside.
Conclusions
There is little doubt that if the object of systemic change in the Soviet bloc was to be
transition to democracy and to market economy, it failed on both accounts. The basis of democracy
is the rule of law, which necessarily implies very limited state intervention in the economic sphere,
as regards both (state) ownership and redistributive policies. Hence, although transition economies
are indeed market economies according to the meaning Mises attributes to this term
21, they surely
do not work according to market principles.
On the other hand, with the exception of catholic Poland, where human dignity was
revitalized before the downfall of Communism, transition has achieved indisputable success in
awakening the sense of individual responsibilities in the Soviet bloc. Even among those individuals
who deliberately refuse to accept responsibilities and end up by advocating an all-comprehensive
paternalistic regime. Indeed, the ongoing success of former communist parties in Eastern Europe
does not answer a demand for central planning and totalitarianism, but rather for paternalistic
conservatism. From an economic viewpoint, this implies that transition has now allowed scholars to
ask meaningful questions about the praxeological adequacy of post-Soviet policy-making.
The answers in this respect are however still mixed, perhaps even confusing. If one
understands transition in the formerly Soviet Empire as an attempt to accomplish a neoclassical
reform, then post-Soviet policy-making has been a double failure. Both because neoclassical reform
is inadequate to obtain free market, and because neither free market nor neoclassical institutional
engineering were compatible with the preferences of the agents, presumably more inclined towards
paternalism. As discussed earlier on, the notion of spontaneous transition was the tool through
                    
21  According to von Mises a market economy is one that is open to price signals and relies upon
such signals for its working. This does not necessarily mean that market signals are correct. In other
words, a market economy may well be far away from a "free-market ideal. For instance, price
signals can be distorted by government interference, both when it imposes taxation and when it
transfers resources to industries, single companies, individuals.
The case of a free or distorted market economy is opposed to that of a planned economy,
where price signals are totally absent. Prices are used only as units of account to transform physical
quantities into homogenous magnitudes.17
which constructivism was legitimized. This sounds paradoxical. It becomes however clearer when
one recalls that the Soviet system fell apart almost accidentally, if one may call Gorbachev and
Pope John Paul II "historical accidents". Unfortunately, bloodless collapse and historical fortune
have been subsumed under the term spontaneity, with the consequences mentioned above.
In this light, perhaps more relevant questions of praxeological relevance remain open to
investigation. For it is crucial to assess whether the present institutional framework is flexible
enough to accommodate today's yearning for paternalistic policies, but strong enough to resist
pressure to transform paternalism into redistribution and thereby award privileges to new rent-
seeking coalitions that have little to do with paternalism or with broadly undefined free-market
principles.
Some concern in this direction seems justified. Ten years of social engineering have
changed the system in such a way that discretionary power remains high. Contrary to the
communist system, the Party no longer runs the economy, but it is still true that the political
leadership enjoys high discretion as far as the rules of the game are concerned. Given the role of
nationalism and paternalism this is not necessarily a negative element, in that centralized power is
the only mean to provide guarantees in such domains. The main problems with the present
institutional settings is that it seriously reduces the possibility of taking advantage of the
praxeological change occurring in the post-Soviet bloc. As individuals enhance their knowledge
and become aware of new opportunities, their preferences and their behaviour change. To some
extent this has already taken place in the past decade, especially among young people. The question
thus remains without an answer. The current system was designed to bridge the gap between an old
system incompatible with the incumbent praxeology; and a new system with more or less
unchanged praxeological patterns and unknown institutional preferences. Hopes for neutral rules
apt to take into account the new preferences have turned out to be misplaced. Indeed, there is reason
to believe that a new round of constructivism might create new myths, but will not necessarily
accommodate the needs of new generations of individuals.18
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